ABSTRACT. The Bul~arian land reform process is burdened by a fundamental tension between disruption and continuity. 'Ihi.s tension arises from the dual roles played by the nomenJ:iatura in the transition to a market economy. Both roles stem from their privileged status in the old order. While the nomenJdaluu have the potential to provide the agricultural sector with indispew;ahle human capital, they also have the' potential to extract rents from the sector, thus undermining its competitiveness. Both the productivity of nomenklatura capital and their capacity to extract rents are diminished to the extent that the reform disrupts the established agrarian order. Thus in order to 6ucceed, the agrarian t reform process must sail between Scylla and Charybdis. Too much disruption degrades economic productivity, possibly to the extent of threatening the viability of the reform movement itself. Too much continuity skews the distribution of political power in favor of the nomenllatura, which may undermine the competitiveness of the nascent free market institutions. This chapter develops a formal political-«pnomic model of this tradeoff. The model challenges the conventional political economic wisdom that decoupliog politics from economics will improve economic performance. In particular, we identify conditions under which the quality of the transition is enhanced by coupling the nomenklatura's acquisition of political power to the magnitude of the rents that they extract.
I1'\TRODVCTION
In this chapter, we investigate the political and economic dynamics of the agrarian reform currently underway in Bulgaria. As in other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, the purpose of this reform is, ostensibly, to reorganize economic institutions in the countryside to promote a competitive agricultural sector. Bulgaria's reform process, however, has been more radical than other CEE reforms. In particular, the land restitution process stipulated by the Law for Land Ownership and Land Use l (LALOLU) is distinguished by its extreme "precision" requirements. The real boundaries provision of LALOLU entitles I land owners or their heirs to the precise parcels of land that they owned in 1946, prior to the advent of Communist rule. Given the extensive internal migration that occurred during the collectivization process in the 1950s, there is presumably little correlation between these 1946 boundaries and the plots farmed by peasants at the end of the Communist era.
Under these conditions, such a high degree of precision-we will use the term historical precision-necessarily entails intensive analysis and verification of historical records as well as an elaborate dispute resolution procedure for evaluating and reconciling competing claims.
This process has resulted in delays, confusion and losses in agricultural output. 1 Indeed, at the time of writing there is a real danger that the transition process will bog down and ultimately stall. Thus, from a purely economic standpoint, the reformers' emphasis on historical precision seems indefensible.
One possible explanation is that the reformers are primarily ideologues, who care less about economic efficiency than about smashing all remnants of the old system, out of hatred of Communism. There are, however, alternative explanations based on incentives and rationality. One such explanation is offered by Jo Swinnen in another chapter in this volume.
J 5« Swinnen's chapter in this volwne for a detailed history of the political debate sunoundin& this le&ialation.
2 One recent report of the prop-eu of tbe land refonn confirms tM analysis: "On 19 October officials announced that a ~overnment prot;TIUll deait;ned to reetore .tate lands to ~mIllUDi&t ownen was bei~ advere.ely affected by inflated claims. Accordint; to an at;r1culture ministry report, (ormer 01lT\e ... have lltaked claims to 35,000 more bectares of land than actuallyexillts. The ministry report maintains that eome courts, which have a\Je&edly not inveati&ated claillUl satillfactorily before makin& award&, have played 110 lar&e role in creatin, the CUlTent problema. Georp Khinchev, an at;r1culture mini8try repre&entative, said that to date alit;htly more than Z8% of &llland. claimed have been returned to their ri&htful owne ...... Stan Marlootich, RFE/RL Dui/, Rtporf, No. fOf, fa Octoler, "93. ) . ,
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SwinnCll m'p;u('s that the reform process in Bulgaria is an arena for a strnggle between the former Communists and the anti-Communist reformers oyer the "future political constellation" of rural society. Under this interpretation a clear justification for historical precision emerges.
The disruption it causes is a tool for reorganizing rural social and political relationshipswhat we call the "agrarian order." The degree to which the old order is changed by the reform process will have profound economic and political effects on post-reform society. Of partie.,.
. ular importance in this process will be the role played by the leaders of the old order-the nomenklatura.
The political and economic power of the nomenklatura in rural Bulgaria stems from their status in two institutional structures which dominated agrarian society prior to the "reyolution" in 1989: the Communist Party and the management hierarchy of the collective farms. During the forty-three years of Communist rule, institutional relationships 'within these two structures permeated local social relationships between the peasantry and their nomenklatura supervisors, endo'wing the latter ,,'ith a social power that transcen~ed the legitimacy of the institutions themselves. The removal of the Communist government in 1989 created something of an institutional limbo in rural Bulgaria. \Vhile the institutional details of Communism were eliminated, its gestalt was not so easily annulled. Vestiges of the old structure-in particular, the localized social and economic relations between the nomenklatura and the peasantry-have persisted. That is, while the nomenklatura's power originated in the context of collectivized agriculture, it has survived, albeit tarnished, despite' the dismantling of thls structure.
In many quarters, it is feared that the nomenklatura will regain some form of ascendancy in the new system by leveraging this vestigial social power. One scenario under which . this could happen is as follows. Since post-reform agriculture "ill initially be organized around plots which are of far less than optimal scale, efficiency can be attained only if the new, small farms are consolidated into larger productive units. In order to operate these units successfully, certain kinds of human capital-including organizational and networking
•
. , 3 skills-will be required. Because the only group that has had the opportunity to develop this kind of capital is the nomenklatura, they are the natural candidates to take a leadership role ill a newly organized agricultural system. 'VeIl, capitalism requires capitalists. Given that they have vastly greater experience in agricultural management than the peasantry, one may ask-why not let the nomenklatura become the new capitalists? Presumably, some reformers fear that if the nomenklatura are allowed to playa pivotal economic role in the new market-based system, they ,,-ill be able to leverage their vestigial social and newly acquired economic power to obtain political power.
In this view, the nomenklatura can be expected to use this power to re-institutionalize I distortionary policies aimed at garnering rent for themselves at the expense of consumer and producer welfare.
In short, there is here a dialectic between disruption and continuity. Effective reform requires action on two fronts, each of which can jeopardize the other: swift removal of the old agrarian order followed by the establishment of new, sustainable institutions to take its place. The former requires disruption and speed-the social networks of the nomenklatura must be dislodged quickly. The latter demands continuity and caution-a transition that is stable and consistent enough to guarantee that the new institutions, ones based on ideas antithetical to the recent experience of Bulgaria, have time enough to "stick." Though this tension arises, in one form or another, in transition processes across Central and Eastern Europe, it is especially stark in Bulgaria (Swinnen, 1994) .
To investigate this tradeoff we construct a two stage Stackelberg model. In the first stage, three political parties representing client interest groups negotiate a reform package. This package is then implemented, inducing some degree of disruption in the agrarian order. This disruption has consequences for the post-reform economic and political environment. In particular, the degree of disruptiveness of the reform determines the distribution of political power between the interest groups in stage two, the post-reform era. In this era, the interest groups use their political power to influence government policy. The second stage of our .,
. , \Ve abstract from the institutional details of particular policy packages by representing policy in each stage by a single composite index. That is, we model policymakers as negotiating over the end result of a complex mix of policy decisions, bypassing the process of setting individual policy instruments. In the first stage of the model, the object of negotiations is the disruptiveness of the reform. In the second stage, the negotiations determine the extent of distortion in the post-reform economy, where by "distortion'" \\'e mean the deviation between .
the consumer and producer price levels in the agricultural market.
These abstractions lead to a simple characterization of the dilemma facing policymakers.
It is represented by the disruption-distortion locus graphed in figure 1. The horizontal axis in the figure measures the degree of correlation, p, between the structure of pre-and postreform social relations in the countryside. A high degree of correlation is associated with a . low level of disruption. \Vhen p is set to one, the old order is perfectly preserved. As p tends to zero, the old order is increasingly fragmented.
The vertical axis in the figure measures the degree of competitiveness of the post-reform economy, which we denote by o. A high degree of competitiveness is associated '\lith a 1946-1989. 3 The Socialists represent the interests of the nomenklatura. The BSP seeks to maintain the old order so as to increase the political : power of the nomenkl.atura in the post-reform economy, and hence increase the level of rents they extract. The Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), at the opposite end of the political . spectrum, consists of the radical reformers to whom we have previously referred. The UDF J For a det&l1ed description 01 the political dndopmeDta in Bulpria.mce 1989 _ other chapters in thia rolume. We omit .' th.i. de.criptlon here. .
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, represents the interests of historical land claimants. In a closed economy 'with sufficiently inelastic demand, gains in productivity reduce producer surplus, as do distortionary policies."
.
For both reasons, the uor prefers a low level of p in the bargaining game.
Both of these parties actually exist in Bulgarian politics, and while the stylized preferences we attribute to them here are perhaps only one interpretation of political events in Bulgaria, they are at least based on documented positions taken by the parties since 1989. In contrast, our third political party is a hypothetical construction which we call the "center" (CTR) . Its goal in the bargaining game is to maximize the sum of consumer and producer surplus .
. One justification for including the CTR is that it vaguely represents the centrist movements that have arisen in Bulgaria since 1989. Generally, these reformist elements have been less motivated by anti-Communism than by a desire to smooth the pain of the transition process by protecting the interests of both consumers and producers. However, to the extent that our model is general enough to apply to a broader class of transition environments beyond Bulgaria, a more natural interpretation is to view the CTR as a vehicle for incorporating into the policy process the normative interests of external agents, such as the World Bank or the IMF, which have an interest in increasing the efficiency of the transition.
In the second stage of the model, the post-reform government acts as a Stackelberg follower. Taking the p resulting from the first stage bargaining game as given, it selects a level of distortion between consumer and producer prices in the agricultural market so as to maximize the weighted sum of nomenklatura rent, consumer surplus and producer surplus. 
THE ECONOMIC MODEL
The post-reform economy has one !leCtor ",·hich produces an homogeneous agricultural commodity solely for domestic consumption (i.e., there is no foreign trade). At the end of the transition period, all land claimants are given plots of land of equal size and quality.
The only distinction between one land reform and another is its degree of disruption. All farmers use the same production technology. Per-hectare output, q, is given by
where It is a generic variable input, a its production elasticity and v represents nomenklatura "experience services." These services refer to the productive skills and connections that the nomenklatura have to offer the post-reform economy.
We assume that both inputs are supplied competitively-a clear deviation from reality justified in that factor market imperfections have little to contribute to our story. \Vhile one might expect that the nomenklatura could ",ield market power in the provision of their services since they monopolize the skills they have to offer, we ignore this complication here.
In the model, the nomenklatura supply their skills elastically at some price, p". Nomenklatura services not employed in the agricultural sector are assumed to be employed in other sectors at the same wage rate. As a consequence, the nomenklatura's payoff is independent of their utilization in agriculture, allowing us to focus on their rent-seeking activities.
\Vhile the nomenklatura themselves cannot influence the price of their services, we do assume that this price is affected by the transition. Because their experience and connections were acquired in the context of, and are specific to, the old agrarian order, the more disruptive the transition, the less useful the nomenklatura's services will be in the post-reform economy.
\Vhile there are a number of ways to model this phenomenon, the simplest is to interpret the production technology as utilizing "efficiency" units instead. of actual units of nomenklatura
services. An increase in p (i.e., greater continuity with the old order) causes the productivity of these services to rise. This is equivalent to reducing the number of efficiency units required , .
T to produce a fixed level of output, which in turn is equivalent to a reduction in the price \ of each efficiency unit. Such a reduction in the price of nomenklatura services, in turn,
rotates the supply curve outwru:d, which, other things equal, affects three important economic variables: demand for nomenklatura services increases, output rises, and both producer and consumer prices go down. These are the effects we refer to when we discuss the relationship between disruption and productive efficiency.
The efficiency price of nomenklatura services is the primary way in which the transition affects the economic structure. The secondary way is through the fixed costs of production.
We assume that in setting up farm operations after being given their parcels of land, new I farmers incur fixed costs. Arguably, a more disruptive reform exacerbates these start-up costs. For this reason, fixed costs decline with p. \Vhile justifiable from the standpoint of--realism, we include fixed costs entirely for technical reasons. They provide the concavity we need to ensure a deterministic solution to the bargaining model.
Our notion of economic equilibrium is completely standard. The production function in (2.1) gives rise to a linear aggregate supply curve. In equilibrium, the producer price, PP' is equal to the marginal cost of production. The demand side of the market is even simpler.
Aggregate demand is given by an exogenously specified, stationary, linear demand curve.
Consumer and producer welfare are measured by their respective surpluses. As shown in . panel (a) of figure 3, producer and consumer prices diverge in equilibrium as a result of rentseeking by the nomenklatura: that is, 6 = Pc -P, ~ O. The nomenklatura receive the rent from this distortion, corresponding to rectangle (6 x q). These rents are the nomenklatura's only payoff in the model.
It is useful to graphically d~cribe what happens to ~ach interest group's payoff if . the disruptiveness of the reform increases, holding distortion constant. Panel (b) of figure 3 depicts such a scenario. More disruption (lower p) rotates the supply curve to the left, reducing equilibrium quantity -and raising both consumer and producer prices. IT distoi-tion _ is held constant, this unambiguously implies that nomenklatura rent and ~nsumer ~i~~
FIGURE 3. The distorted agricultural market in the post-reform economy declines. Whether producer surplus increases depends upon the relative elasticities of supply and demand at the new equilibrium..
We have kept our economic model straightforward in order to focus attention on the political model, to which we now turn. \Ve first analyze the second stage decision of the government reacting as a Stackelberg follower to the reform. \Ve then turn to the multilateral bargaining game which determines the disru~tiveness of the reform.
THE POST-REFORM POLITICAL MODEL
The level of distortion in the post-reform economy is determined by a political process .
within which competmg interest groups lobby the government for preferential policies. The depth of the government's commitment to free-market institutions will reJlect the relative strength of these interest groups. For instance, a strong nomenklatura lobby can be expected to hinder the development of a commercial and' legal infrastructure that facilitates free competition. As Zusman (1976) and Rausser and Zusman (1992) ... _----.- . . 
where 6, the distortion per unit of output, is chosen by the government, i indexes the three interest groups, including consumers, producers and the nomenklatura, Wi is i's political power coefficient and 11", is i's payoff. Two interesting questions naturally arise. First, how are the political weights in the government's objective function determined? Second, what is the relationship between the government's decision and the transition bargaining? \Ve address the latter question first.
3.1. The Government's Reaction FUnction. In our model, the government is a Stackelberg follower-it makes its decision after the transition bargaining has already determined the extent of disruption in the agrarian order. This means that the payoffs and the power weights of the interest groups are implicit functions of p, the disruptiveness of the reform. It i directly follows that the optimal distortion chosen by the government will also be a function of p. We can therefore derive the government's "reaction function," which indicates the level of distortion the government optimally selects for every-possible value of p. We denote this reaction function by 6(p). Panel (a) in figure 4 graphs such a reaction function. This is pre-, d~y the p-6 tradeoff we discussed in the introduction (see figure I) . The most important feature of the diagram in panel (a) is that the graph of the government's reaction function is upward sloping. This means that a more continuous transition induces the government to choose higher levels of dis~tion. This reflects the fundamental political-economic tradeoff in the model: while continuity with the old order improves productive efficiency, it does so at the cost of allocative efficiency in the form of rent-seeking by the nomenklatura. The steepness of the government's reaction function is a measure of the severity of this tradeoff.
A very flat reaction function implies that increases in productive efficiency can be "bought cheaply" vis-a-vis corresponding reductions in allocative efficiency. Conversely, a very steep reaction function indicates that the "price" of increasing productivity is quite high in terms of lost rents. Interpreting the slope of the reaction function as the "price" of gains in pr~uc tive efficiency is a very useful insight because it allows us to use standard consumer theoretic tools to analyze the decision problems confronting the political parties in the bargaining game.
In panel (a) of figure 4 we have drawn an indifference curve for each of the political parties .
. These indifference curves mark the optimal locations in p-6 space for each of the parties given the reaction function in panel (a). These" preferences are consistent with those we ascribed to these parties in the discussion on pages 5 and 6. The BSP and the UDr are at opposite extremes-the BSP prefers high, while the UDF prefers low, levels of both distortion and p.6 The CTR falls in the middle: its utility is decreasing in distortion; since it cares about consumer as well as producer surplus, it values productive efficiency more than the UDF, and.
thus is willing to tolerate a larger level of.distortion. \Ve restrict the following discussion to the CTR, although similar arguments apply to the UDF as well.
Panel (b) of figure 4 shows a detailed view of the CTR's preferences. The range is panel (b) is sufficiently small that the government's reaction function i~ well represented by a straight 6 The argument so far has been about individual party preferences. The diagrams used in this section do not depict equilibria to the bargaining game. Rather they represent building blocks in the analysis of the bargaining model Before getting to the bargaining, however, we must discuss two more building blocks. First, we focus on the determination of the political power weights, i.e., the wi's in the government's objective function. Second, we relate the distribution of political power to the slope of the government's reaction function.
3.2. The Determination of the Political Power Weights. Because our primary concern is with the way in which the nomenklatura acquire political power, consumers and producers have no independent sources of power in our model. Power acquisition is therefore a zero-sum game-gains in inHuence by the nomenklatura imply complementary losses for producers and consumers. VVe normalize the power weights such that once Wn is determined, consumers and producers are allocated the residual such that all three coefficients sum to unity.
To analyze the determinants of nomenklatura political power, we introduce the notion of a political-economic technology, or PET. In general, a PET is a rule which maps social and economic power into political power. \Ve have already informally discussed, in the introduction, the sociology of the nomenklatura '8 relations with the peasantry and how . . . 15 the transition determines the extent to "'hich these relationships remain intact. \Ve now formalize these notions by examining three kinds of political-economic technologies.
The simplest one incorporat:s only sociological factors and assigns no role to economics:
In this simple linear technology, nomenklatura power is increasing in p at a rate 1p, which measures the strength of the linkage between sociology and political power. We label this technology decoupled (D~C) because it is independent of endogenous post-reform economic variables-it .depends solely on the disruptiveness of the transition. Under this lET, a more continuous transition increases nomenklatura power, "'bile a more disruptive transition reduces it.
\Ve now consider two additional PETs which couple economic and political power. The first conceives of economic power as measured by some index, 1', of demand for nomenklatura , , expenence servIces:
For lack of empirical guidance, ·we ~pose a Cobb-Douglas technology. Note that this technology collapses to the decoupled technology when A is set equal to one. We label this PET the power is visibility technology, or VIS for short. The interpretation is that nomenklatura power derives from visibility in the economy. The more they are seen to be contributing productively to the economy, the more Vtilling the populace will be to accept them in a leadership role. Alternatively, the more they are needed in the marketplace the more they will be able to capitalize on local sociological relationships with the peasantry to gain political leverage against central government policies they dislike. The VIS technology is not neut.ral with respect to the post-reform economy, as demand for nomenklatura services declines in the face of increasing distortion. This means nomenklatura power is therefore dependent upon the government's choice of distortion. But from the government's objective function
in equation (3.1), of course, the leyel of distortion depends upon nomenklatura power. So, under a VIS technology, distortion and nomenklatura power are simultaneously determined. In the follov.ing sections, we will demonstrate that slight changes in the specification of the political-economic technology-reHecting changes in the way in which the nomenklatura are assumed to acquire power-can have dramatic effects on the shape of the government's Stackelberg reaction function, and hence, ultimately, on the quality of the transition. In particular, the two feedback effects mentioned above operate in opposite directions. Thus, economic performance is likely to be very sensitive to whether nomenklatura power is founded upon their contribution to productive activity, or whether it is based on the depths of their pockets.
In 
THE COMPARATIVE STATICS OF POLITICAL EcONOMIC TECHNOLOGIES
In this section we investigate the comparative statics properties of the technology that relates economics to political power. \Vhile there has been relatively little formal study of this question, it is a topic about which economists are likely to have strong intuitions, derived from general political-economic principles. For example, it would appear, intuitively, that our decoupled PET should outperform the others, in the sense of leading to a higher quality transition. This conclusion would appear to follow immediately from the basic premise underlying this paper: potentially, the nomenklatura can provide economies in transition v.ith valuable productive services, but reformers in transition economies are generally unwilling to 9 J.. distortion increaaea, quantity d«linea., but the product of diatortkJo and quantity (i.e., .omt1l!1ct.,.. rent) alway. nology is likely to do less damage than the PIN. After all, the latter actually re\\-ards the nomenklatura's socially undesirable behavior-i.e., rent-seeking-while the former at least rewards socially productiye behavior-i.e., the provision of scarce experience services. The major lesson .to be learned from this paper is that, in general, neither of these intuiyons is generally true.
\Ve will limit the present discussion to comparative statics analysis around the political-.
economic equilibrium for the decoupled technology. That is, we will rewrite the decoupled technology as either a VIS or a PIM technology with a ). value of unity (see equations 3.3 and 3.4). \Ve then reduce). slightly in either case-thus adding a small "dose" of either the VIS or the PIM technology-and compare the political-economic equilibria of the original and the perturbed political economies. It is important to note that none of the economic parameters of these economies' are .affected by the perturbations. The only relationship which is affected is the one that links economic activity to the post-reform political power distribution. As observed in the previous section, a change in this distribution will shift the government's reaction function and hence the solution to the first stage bargaining game.
We are particularly interested in the effect of changing the political-economic technology on the equilibrium levels: of disruption, distortion and economic welfare.
Before proceeding, we digress to address a delicate methodological issue. When perturbing : the political-economi~ technology away from a pure decoupled regime in the direction of one of the others, an additional degree of freedom is added to the technology specification. In the case of the PIM technology, this is the parameter 18, which determines the sensitivity of nomenklatura power to the magnitude of the rents they extract (see equation 3.4). \\That
• < 20 value should be assigned to this parameter? IT a very small value for il is chosen, then relative to the initial equilibrium, nomenklatura power (w n ) will plummet and distortion ".ill fall, 50
that welfare "ill necessarily rise. Conversely a Yery large choice of il "ill necessarily result in a decrease in welfare relative to the initial equilibrium. Clearly, then, the comparative statics problem is not even well-defined unless a criterion is specified in advance for determining the appropriate value for il. Fortunately, the economic tradition of analyzing "compensated variations" dictates a natural criterion: the value of il should be determined by the condition that the p-6 graph associated with the perturbed technology must intersect the corresponding graph for the original technology at the original political-economic equilibrium level of p.
The preceding observation is illustrated in figure 6 . Variables and graphs denoted with a "0" subscript refer to the economy under the decoupled regime. The equilibrium under this regime is (Po, do). The cun'es U o , U 1 and U 2 are iso-welfare lines (i.e., indifference curves for the eTR party) .10 In the left panel, il is chosen so that the above criterion is satisfied: the new p-fJ tradeoff dl (p) passes through the original equilibrium point. In the right panel, a higher value of il is chosen and the new p-o tradeoff 62(P) rises more steeply. The effects on equilibrium disruption, distortion and welfare are quite different in the two panels. The moral of these pictures is that unless some criterion is specified in advance for selecting a unique il for the purposes of comparative statics, anything can happen and nothing can be learnt.
We now return to our comparative statics analysis. \\That is the effect of a perturbation of the political-economic technology in the direction of the PIM regime, adjusting il so that the p-o tradeoff swivels through the equilibrium point for the original system? As discussed on page 18, the effect of the perturbation is to steepen the slope of the government's reaction function, i.e., the p-d tradeoff. As the slope of the tradeoff steepens, the price of reducing disruption increases. Just as the CTR's individual response in figure 10 was to reduce both 
" :
t .
• ' :
, . . Observe that the political-economic equilibrium ~der the original technology is located to the right of the welfare-maximizing point along the tradeoff line (i.e., the CTR's proposal in the ,final round). As discussed on page 13, the effect of shifting , towards PIM is to steePen the p-d tradeoff, i.e., to increase the "price" of reducing disruption.
6, ··········jf·
Ac~dingly, the finai-round proposals made by both the CTR and the UDF shift to the left.
These changes in final round proposals have multiple effects that are transmitted all the way back up the inductive chain. For the range of parameter values that we have considered, the net effect is to further isolate the BSP and thus to diminish its bargaining power. It follows
The effect on the bargainin~ of a shift towards PIM that the ultimate solution to the bargaining problem must shift to the left. Thus, the effect of shifting to a PIM technology is to increase equilibrium. disruption and reduce equilibrium distortion.
In the example described in figure 7 , equilibrium. welfare increased as a result of the technology shift. More generally, however, the effect on welfare of shifting towards PIM will depend on the location of the initial equilibrium value of p relative to the p-value that maximizes welfare. Figure 8 provides the intuition Coc this result. In the top-left panel, the initial equilibrium (Po, c50) is to the left of the point on the p-o tradeoff that maximizes . The other possibility is illustrated in the right panels of figure 8. The initial equilibrium lies on the downv.-ard sloping portion of the p-welfare locus, i.e., there is too little disruption and too much distortion. As in the bottom-left panel, the perturbation in technology shifts the equilibrium to the left, but in this case, welfare increases. Each one of these results is reversed for the VIS technology. A perturbation towards VIS shifts the equilibrium to the right rather than the left. In this case, welfare will increase if the initial value of p is on the uphill segment of the p-welfare locus, and decrease otherwise.
To illustrate these results, we will present a group of computer simulated examples. We begin by constructing a base-case political-economic system in which the equilibrium disrupt tion level and the level at which welfare is maximized are exactly coincident at p = 0.6. The base-case system has a pure decoupled PET. \Ve then consider two variants of this system and analyze the effects of perturbing each variant in the direction of either the VIS or the PIM technologies. In our first variant, productivity increases with p-and hence allocative efficiency deteriorates with disruption-at a ~lower rate than in the base-case system. Under The results for these two variants illustrate the preceding discussion. In the first, the shift towards the PIM technology steepens the p-d tradeoff. The bargaining solution moves to the left, reducing 6 relative to the initial level, Conversely, the shift towards the VIS technology flattens the tradeoff. Thus, the bargaining solution moves to the right and 6 increases. Since in the first variant, 6 was too large to begin with, the shift towards PIM improves ",·elfare while the shift towards VIS reduces it. In the second variant, the effects on p and 6 of shifting toward either technology are qualitatively the same as in the first variant. In this case, however, 6 was too low to begin " .. ith, so that it is a shift towards VIS, not PIM, that . improves welfare.
In one respect, these results seems quite natural; in another they seem quite the counterintuitive. Naturally, starting from a point at which welfare increases with p, a shift towards VIS, which will increase p, will benefit society. An interpretation is that the nomenklatura
should be rewarded with political power on the basis of the productive component of their behavior-i.e., their provision of experience services-when the gains that accrue from this behavior exceed the losses from the associated non-productive component-i.e., rent acquisition. This seems logical-a matter of aligning the incentives of the nomenklatura and society in general. The counterintuitive result is that starting from a point at which welfare decreases with p, a shift towards PIM Vtill be beneficial. The analogous interpretation is that the nomenklatura should ,be rewarded on the basis of the the undesirable component of their behavior, precisely ""hen at the margin this behavior costs society more than the productive component benefits it! This recommendation seems ironic, to say the least: rfeward rent-acquisition precis~.~hen it is most damaging?
On further reflection, however, the apparent paradox evaporates. An oversimplified ex-.
planation of the resolution is as follows. The outcome of the bargaining game re1lects the balance of power between the UDF and the BSP. From a social welfare perspective, the UDF wants too much disruption while the BSP wants too little. If the bargaining powers of the two parties are appropriately balanced, then the optimal level of distortion can be attained in the political-economic equilibrium for the system. If the UDF has too much power, the equilibrium level of p will be' too large, i.e., welfare will be increasing at the equilibrium level of p. If the UDF has too little power, welfare will be decreasing at the equilibrium p.
Now one determinant of the balance of power is the location of the CTR's preferences. If these preferences are realigned toward one of the extreme parties, then the balance of power Vtill be tilted in favor of that party. A perturbation of the political-economic technology accomplishes just such a realignment. After a perturbation towards VIS, increments in pare less costly, so that the eTR's preferences become more closely aligned with the BSP's. Conversely, after a perturbation towards PIM, these increments are more costly, and the CTR's preferences become more aligned with the UDF's. It follows that when the UDF has too much .
. power initially, a shift towards VIS will redress the balance, while if the BSP has too much power, then a shift towards PHd will redress it.
The preceding discussion gives rise to the following question: if there is an initial imbalance of power between the UDF and the BSP, why can the CTR not redress this balance hy strategically misrepresenting its preferences? The answer is that our political-economic • eql1ilibrimn is required to be subgame perfect. For example, suppose that the BSP is "too powerful" relative to the UDF, so that the equilibrium level of p is too high. Now if the CTR were to propose a lower level of p than is actually optimal for it in the last round of the bargaining, then the BSP's bargaining strength would be ""eakened, and the solution valut' of p would move to the left, closer to the CTR's real optimal level. Thus, by strategically misrepresenting its preferences in this way, the CTR could manipulate the bargaining environment in order to increase welfare. This misrepresentation would, however, violate subgame perfection: the CTR cannot credibly threaten to make a proposal that .,.'ould not be in its best interests, when the time comes to make it. On the other hand, if there is an exogenous shift in the political-economic technology, then the CTR's preferences will genuinely be realigned, so that the CTR's credibility would not be at issue.
CONCLUSlON
In this chapter we have taken the position that the preeminent characteristic of the Bulgarian land reform process is the degree to ""hich it disrupts the social order in the countryside.
Of particular importance is how the reform affects the nomenklatura-the leaders of the old order. The nomenklatura are pivotal for two reasons. On the one hand, they monopolize the human capital required to make the transition economically viable. \Vithout the skills and connections they acquired while managing Communist agriculture, it seems likely that agricultural productivity will suffer, which in turn may threaten the political viability of the reform movement. On the other hand, the nomenklatura have a history of extracting rents from the agricultural sector. If they are allowed to accrue political influence within the ne.,.· system they can be expected to manipulate policy for this purpose, thereby undermining the competitiveness of the new market institutions. In choosing the degree of disruption caused by a reform package, the reformers are in essence balancing a complicated political-economic tradeoff. A highly disruptive reform, ""hile limiting the productive potential of the nomenklatura's experience services, has the benefit of reducing their political influence and thus the allocative inefficiency associated with their rent-seeking. A very continuous reform, while risking greater nomenklatura pov .. er and thus greater distortion in the agricultural market, can make· more effective use of the productive potential of the nomenklatura. The severity of this tradeoff is the focal·point of the formal model we have developed here.
Because th~ political parties in the first stage game are aware of how the post-ieform government selects its distortion level and use this information when offering proposals in
the bargaining game, the interaction between competing offers in this game is extremely .. sensitive to the way in which the nomenklatura acquire political. power in the post-reform era. We therefore develop the notion of a political-economic technology (PET) which specifies how the nomenklatura convert their social. inHuence and economic activity into political po,,·er. The main result of the model is that the conventional political-economic wisdom-that policies which decouple politics from economics, "ill be welfare improvingis not generally correct. '''Ie identify conditions under which coupling the nomenklatura '5 post-reform political power to the size of the rents they extract from the agricultural market actually hardens the bargaining position of the radical reformers in stage one and which leads to higher post-reform social " .. elfare.
,(
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• it is less preferable to each party than any negotiated level of p. The main result of Rausser and ~imon (1991) is that the equilibrium of the bargaining game is essentially independent of t.he precise number of nego~ating rounds, provided that this number is sufficiently large.
14 Like all such games, our multilateral bargaining model is solved by backward induction.
The solution may be obtained by applying a simple computational algorithm. Since in the last. round of the game the alternative to agreement is the default alternative, a consensus can be obtained in support of any option in this round. It follows that the final round proposal in any party's equilibrium strategy will globally maximize the party's payoff along the p-o tradeoff curve. Whichever proposal is selected by nature in the final round rill be accepted by all parties. IS Now consider the decision problem facing players in the penultimate round of negotia-_ ....
tions. In equilibrium, each party will accept any tabled proposal that satisfies the party's participation constmint, i.e., any proposal that yields a payoff level at least as great as the party's reseroation utility, which is its expected utility conditional on disagreement in the current round. 16 It follows that the penultimate round proposal of any party's equilibrium strategy must be the p-value that maximizes that party's payoff, subject to the condition that the other parties' participation constraints are both satisfied. Proceeding backwards up the game tree with this algorithm, we can compute the proposals that each party must submit in each round of negotiations. In equilibrium, whichever proposal is selected by "nature" in the first round will be unanimously accepted. Thus, in equilibrium, play never proceeds beyond the first round.
To illustrate the structure of the algorithm, we provide a numerical example. II To oompute tbia reeerT&tion utility, take tbe weipted aum of the utilities tbe party receiYea from each of the propoula aubmiued in tbe fI.nal round, wbere the wdpu are tbe playen' aoce. probabilitiaa. assumes a given economy and a political-economic technology, so that the p-o tradeoff is determined. It is represented in figure 9 by the heavy solid line. The three solid bullets . along this line denote the proposals that each party makes in the final round of negotiations.
As the indifference curves indicate, the proposal in each case maximizes the proposer's payoff over the entire range of p values. Now consider the downward-facing shaded arc v.ith the dotted edge. This denotes the boundary of the UDF's participation constraint, i.e., the set of (p, c5) points that yield the UDF at least its resen'ation utility, which is in this case the access-probability-weighted combination of the utility levels the UDF derives from each of .
the three solid bullets. The UDF will accept any point on the heavy solid line that satisfies this constraint. Similarly, the upward-facing shaded arc represents the nsp's participation constraint. To avoid further complicating the picture, the CTR's participation constraint is omitted. In this instance, however, the CTR's constraint is no' binding on either the UDF or the nsp.
The dashed indifference curves and unfilled bullets indicate the nsp's and UDF's optimal choices in the penultimate round. In the penultimate round, the nsp's proposal must be at the rightmost edge of the UDF's participation constraint, while the UDF's proposal must be parties'. To illustrate tIlls, we construct an artificial perturbation of the original example, in such a way that in the final round the CTR's optimal proposal is modified but the other parties' proposals are not. Figure 10 is identical to figure 9 except that the p-o tradeoff' has been steepened in a neighborhood of the CTR party's final proposal. Ob5erVe that after this change, the lottery that the UDF will face if the final round is reached is more favorable one, while for the BSP it is less favorable. Consequently, in the penultimate round, the UDF ~-ill be more particular about the proposals it is " .. illing to accept, while the BSP will be less so.
In other words, the UDF's participation constraint in the penultimate round ,,-ill tighten, while the BSP's constraint will slacken. It follows that in the penultimate round, all three players' proposals will lie to the southv.est of their proposals under the original specification.
Inducting backwards up the game-tree, 1\'e conclude that the effect of steepening the slope of the p-o tradeoff in a neighborhood of the CTR's original optimum is to reduce both equilibrium disruption and distortion.
